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On 10 March, EU ﬁnance ministers agreed to roll out Jean-Claude Juncker’s ﬂagship investment
programme, commonly termed the ‘Juncker plan’. Harald Sander writes on the economic impact
the plan could have in the Eurozone. He argues that while it has been portrayed by some observers
as a route to helping the Eurozone’s recovery, it will require far more than the Juncker plan to
stimulate growth in Europe’s ailing economies.
The €315 billion European investment initiative – the so called ‘Juncker plan’ – was accepted by EU
ﬁnance ministers on 10 March and is expected to go operational as a new “European Fund for
Strategic Investment” (EFSI) by mid-2015. Is this ﬁnally good news for Eurozone recovery? Unfortunately, the
Juncker plan has been widely misunderstood as a recovery programme for the crisis-ridden Eurozone: it is in fact no
more and no less than a (welcome) investment initiative for Europe.
The Juncker plan is not a Eurozone recovery programme
What is the oﬃcial rationale for the investment initiative? The European Commission cites a lack of total (public and
private) investment of about €230 billion to €370 billion below the historical norm for the EU28. This gap is viewed
as the key reason for the slow recovery of both the EU28 and the Eurozone.
Consequently, the commission points out that the Investment Plan for Europe has three objectives: “to provide
additional fuel to the EU’s recovery and reverse the drop in investment; to take a decisive step towards meeting the
long-term needs of our economy by boosting competitiveness in strategic areas; and to strengthen the European
dimension of our knowledge, human capital and physical infrastructure, and the interconnections that are vital to our
Single Market.”
Although one listed objective is fuelling Europe’s
recovery, the Juncker plan should not be misread as
the much sought after ﬁscal stimulus, famously
demanded by Mario Draghi to provide the third pillar
for getting the Eurozone back on track, next to
monetary policy and structural reforms.
First, there is an obvious ﬂaw in the Commission’s
diagnosis. The fall in total investment is held
responsible for the lack of recovery, but the role of
austerity is completely ignored. By contrast, Simon
Wren-Lewis has recently presented a counter-factual
estimate that GDP in 2013 might be around 4 per
cent lower because of austerity measures. A new
CEPR paper suggests a similar negative growth
impact from austerity policies and predominantly
identiﬁes cuts in government transfers as the biggest
contributing factor, not investments.
Second, what is really required is a net ﬁscal
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stimulus. Additional ﬁscal and private spending is key in a repressed economy where spending multiplier eﬀects are
high. However, the 21 billion euros for the Juncker plan are ﬁnanced by reallocating, not by increasing ﬁscal
spending. And it is doubtful whether the plan will really trigger additional investment worth €315 billion.
Third, an increase in private investment is not necessarily a solution as it also increases supply. In many Eurozone
countries the problem is not a lack of supply but a lack of demand, i.e. excess supply. The best one can do under
such circumstances is to replace relatively ineﬃcient capital goods with more eﬃcient (e.g. more environmental
friendly) ones, as suggested by Pisani-Ferry.
Fourth, and in a similar vein, the focus on private investment can therefore be misleading when the main objective is
to revive the European economy. Daniel Gros thus argues in favour of a focus on consumption spending and points
to the example of the United States and the UK, where investment has followed consumption growth.
Fifth, the plan explicitly does not focus on problem countries. According to Bloomberg, “EU Commission Vice
President Jyrki Katainen said the plan must resist pressure to steer help to needy regions or nations.” In fact, it is a
plan for all EU28 countries. And yes, it will favour the large countries, which will contribute most to the funding
through their respective national promotional banks and consequently receive most of the investment funding in
return. In sum, the Juncker plan is not the big push on public investment, for which the case is so overwhelming in a
zero-interest-rate environment.
The Juncker plan as an EU investment initiative
While the Juncker plan might do little to bring about a Eurozone recovery, it should nevertheless be welcomed as an
initiative for raising public and private investment and thus long-term competitiveness in the EU. Moreover, it can
and should be used as an instrument to promote European integration and institutional development.
In particular one should mention that: the diverted money from other activities is used as a guarantee and may
therefore have a leverage eﬀect up to 15; it will establish new institutional structures to promote investments in
Europe through the new EFIS; it could have positive eﬀects on promoting the single market by approximating
regulation; it could give the creation of a European capital market union an additional push. Of course, these
envisaged beneﬁts come with caveats, which have been broadly discussed in the past months, such as the well-
known debate over whether the estimated size of the leverage factor is exaggerated or whether additional projects
are being triggered.
Another line of criticism holds that unpredictability and diﬀerences in regulation are more important barriers to
(cross-border) investment than the availability of cheap ﬁnance or the lack of ﬁnancial guarantees. Often bad ﬁnance
is not the problem, but a lack of projects with a suﬃciently high economic return. But rather than an argument
against the EFIS, these concerns just point to what should be done additionally on regulation and on diagnosing
what holds back investments in diﬀerent countries – e.g. by using a diﬀerentiating growth diagnostics approach
rather than one-size-ﬁts-all recipes. Finally, one should note that money is being diverted from other activities,
namely Horizon 2020, which has prompted European universities to protest.
What would a genuine Eurozone recovery plan look like?
The Juncker plan should be welcomed as a long-run strategy to address investment weakness and to promote
(green) growth in Europe. But since Lord Keynes constantly reminds us that in the long run we are all dead, it must
be made crystal clear that the plan does not solve the Eurozone’s current economic problems.
A ﬁscal pillar of a Eurozone recovery plan would look quite diﬀerent and there is widespread consensus among
many economists as to what it would entail: ﬁscal stimulus from countries that can aﬀord it, the return of the golden
rule of public ﬁnance at the national level, which allows for debt ﬁnance of public investment if required, thus giving
more ﬁscal leeway beyond the Maastricht rules, and an additional boost in European/Eurozone public investment.
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